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Abstract 
Nowadays, the dataflux shared between ​IoT systems must be secured from 8-bits to 64-bits processors               
systems. Several symmetric cryptographic algorithm already exist such as AES (Advanced Encryption            
Standard), RC4, Blowfish, etc. In this work, we propose an 8-bits encryption algorithm, combining              
several ideas of standard symmetric encryption algorithms. The aim is to provide a efficient, modular               
and compact algorithm able to tend to truly random one-time-pad encryption quality even for large               
data flux. The algorithm combines the implementation of a divergent polynomial with variable             
coefficients for pseudo-random keys generation, variable bit swapping and bitwise operations on data,             
and the use of one or two passwords. The encryption has been evaluated statistically, tested for image                 
encryption and compared with One-Time-Pad encryption on the same data. Three implementations            
have been tested respectively in C, Javascript and GNU Octave. Encryption time performances are              
compared with AES on a 8-bits architecture: the Arduino Uno (ATmega328) microcontroller. A new              
concept of self-decryptionable web encrypted object, called ​Blocksnet© is also presented and tested as              
a potential application of  the compact and embedded PMSE algorithm.  
Keywords:  ​PMSE,  Cryptography, Symmetric,  Encryption, Modular, Algorithm, Blocksnet 
Introduction  
The use of encryption in order to achieve authenticated communication in networks have been initiated               
for long time [1, Needham et al.]. The symmetric cryptography system is a sequence of operations                
that convert the plain data to encrypted data and the process is reversible in order to get back the                   
original data again [2, Ashraf et al.]. The standard cryptographic algorithm massively used for              
securing internet flux have some drawbacks [3, Al-Hazaimeh et al.], such as iterative rounds for               
AES [4, DES et AES], weakness in decryption process for Blowfish [5, Vaudenay et al.], or high                 
calculation cost for public key encryption like RSA (The Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman) [6, Rivest et                
al, 7, Zhao et al., 8, Rifà-Pous et al.]. Moreover, because no system is truly secured, the worldwide                  
standardization makes one static standard exposed to a large panel of attacks. Therefore, in this work,                
we build a modular encryption algorithm, that can be tuned at each use for specific cryptographic                
purposes enhancing security thanks to versioning and a pretty variable algorithmic core. 
The PMSE algorithm is based on a dedicated byte stream cipher combining a modular pseudo-random               
flux and a reversible versionable deconstruction process for data. The pseudo-random flux is             
calculated from a divergent polynomial of variable coefficients which depends one or two passwords.              
The order of polynomial is also modulable. Then, a xor cipher is applied between pseudo-random key                
and the “deconstructed” data byte. The deconstruction of data byte consist of conditional bit swapping               
where the new arrangement of bits depends on a n-states pseudo-random variable updated at each               
iteration. The number of possible arrangements for data byte deconstruction is tunable. The reverse              
operation (called data “reconstruction”) does not necessarily use the same operands. This conditional             
 
bit swapping combined with variable bitwise operations permits to obtain a non-malleable            
cryptographic system [9, Fishchlin et al.]. This is an additional security implemented by the PMSE               
algorithm.  
I. Algorithm of PMSE 
PMSE use a modified Vernam system, demonstrated as theoretically secured when taking into account              
the Shannon’s conditions [10, Shannon]. PMSE includes the generation of a flux of pseudo-random              
bytes, and the “deconstruction” of data byte possibly in one of ​N different possible arrangements,               
before encryption. The encryption final step consists of the bitwise ​xor operation between modified              
data byte and a pseudo-random byte for each byte of the flux. The schematic representation of                
encryption and decryption is represented in Figure 1. A sequence (e.g. a loop) is initiated with the first                  
byte of data and ended with the last one. Data byte are deconstructed and combined (“​XORed​”) with a                  
different pseudo-random key at each iteration. At the end of this loop, the encryption process is done.                 
The General idea of the algorithm is to pseudo-randomize not only one flux, but also the data and                  
pseudo random generator itself. Therefore pseudo-random flux and data deconstruction processes are            
both highly modulable and versionable.  
a) 
 
b) 
 
Fig.1 Schematic representation of the a) encryption and b) decryption flux. 
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The pseudo-random flux calculation is described in Figure 2. It consists of the calculation of a 
polynomial at each iteration. For instance, a simple first order polynomial could be: 
 x .i  xLn =  2 +  1 (Eq.1.1)  
Or a second order polynomial, including recursivity could be: 
  x .i   x .i Ln =  2
2 +  1 + Ln−1 (Eq.1.2) 
Where ​x​1 and ​x​2 are one of the characters of respectively first and second passwords (or two                 
concatenated parts of a single password). And ​i​ is an iteration number (byte index into the flux). 
The general form of a modular recursive polynomial could be: 
 ∑ x .i   LLn =  k
k + ∑ n−m (Eq.1.2) 
Where the ​x​k are several keys of first and second passwords, ​i is an iteration number (byte index into                   
the flux) and ​L​n-m​ the previous values calculated for ​L​n​.that are added.  
The result ​L​n​, (large number: eg. 32 or 64 bits integer) is then cutted into four or respectively 8 bytes,                    
all combined together into a new byte ​x0 with bitwise ​xor operation. At each iteration the value of ​x​0                   
will change even if the same pair of {​x​1​, ​x​2​} or the same {​x​k​} vector is used, due to ​i incrementation.                     
Then the pair {​x​1​, ​x​2​} or the {​x​k​,} vector is updated from passwords strings. Another temporary key is                  
also calculated from the following equation: 
 x .i  x . xx3 =  1 +  2 3 (Eq.2) 
The result x​3​, (32 bit integer), depends on the updated ​x​1 and ​x​2​, previous x​3 and ​i the incrementation                   
index. Only the 8 LSB of ​x​3 will be used for the current pseudo-random key calculation. Finally the                  
current pseudo-random key ​xt is calculated from ​x​0​, ​x​1​, ​x​2​, ​x​3 and previous ​x​t using bitwise xor                 
operation. This key ​x​t​ will be used for the encryption with the current “deconstructed” data byte. 
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Fig.2 Graphical representation and pseudo-script of the PMSE pseudo-random key generation algorithm. 
If for some index ​i, the current ​x​t is equal to zero, the whole calculation is reinitialized using                  
initialization vector (​iv​). As shown is Figure 2, the values ​x​0​, ​x​1​, ​x​2​, ​x​3​ and ​x​t​ are reinitialized as follow: 
 i mod iv[0]x0 =   i mod iv[1]x1 =   i mod iv[2]x2 =   
 i mod iv[3]x3 =   i mod iv[4]xt =  (Eq.3)  
This exception allows to set a non-zero value for ​x​t depending of iteration index modulo an                
initialization value. In the same time, for the same iteration, the current data byte is “deconstructed”.                
As illustrated in Figure 3, a bit swapping occurs depending of the value of ​x​0 modulo the number of                   
possible bits swapping and partial complementation implemented. Theoretically, the number of           
swapping or permutation combination is higher than byte range. But some permutation give the same               
binary number (only 256 possible values). Additionally the logical ​not operation can be applied to a                
part or to the whole byte in order to increase the number of available reversible bits operations that can                   
be performed on the current databyte. In practice, implementing the byte deconstruction process with              
only four cases will already distort significantly the original data (as shown in next part). The                
implementation of some reversible permutations and/or not operations as well as the number of cases               
are modulable from a version to another version of the algorithm and as mentioned, a lot of                 
combination of operation can be used. The more permutation cases are implemented, the more robust               
and secured the PMSE algorithm is. Notice that the maximum number of permutations and/or bitwise               
operations should be less than 256, due to the fact that the data byte and ​x​0 are both bytes ranging from                     
0 to 255.  
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 Fig.3 Illustration of pseudo-random bit swapping of data performed for each data byte for encryption and in the 
opposite way for decryption. 
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II. Tests and results 
II.a Some entropy tests and encryptions using GNU Octave 
The present algorithm has been implemented into GNU Octave (source codes provided into the              
Supplementary data section) in order to test the entropy of the pseudo-random generator and to               
perform some image encryption. The generation of 10000 bytes has been performed using two small               
passwords : ‘aa’ and ‘bb’ (Figure 4). The signal observed on large (Figure 4-a) or small (Figure 4-b)                  
intervals doesn’t present visually any repetition pattern. The histogram of the distribution of bytes is               
quite uniform on the [0-255] space. The FFT spectrum of the signal generated (Figure 4-d) with these                 
small passwords also suggests that the signal is close to some experimental noise without any               
dominant frequency or possible identification in the frequency domain for this size of sample (10 kB). 
a)
 
b)
 
c) 
 
d) 
 
​Fig.4 a) Generation of 10000 pseudo-random bytes using the algorithm with the passwords respectively equals                
to ‘aa’ and ‘bb’. b) Partial sample of signal of the pseudo-random bytes. c) Histogram, repartition of the 10000                   
bytes in the byte space [0-255]. d) FFT of signal of 10000 pseudo-random generated bytes (10 kB). The                  
polynomial used is the one described in Eq.1.1, the figures have been obtained using the code given in the                   
supplementary data section. 
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In order to complete this first test, some statistics have been computed on several vectors of                
pseudo-random numbers generated with different sets of small (unsecured) passwords with PMSE.            
The statistical correlation between different or similar passwords set is also calculated (Table 1). The               
correlation between vectors of different passwords tends to really low correlation with negative score              
close to zero. Some vectors calculated with similar sets of password give low correlation score by                
changing only one single letter (‘pass’ or’ mass’). Moreover the generation of two pseudo-random              
vectors with the same set of passwords in different order (such as ‘abc’ and ‘bcd’ or ‘bcd’ and ‘abc’)                   
also give low correlation value. 
Passwords ‘aa’  
 ‘bb’ 
‘bonjour’ 
‘hello’ 
‘abc’  
 ‘bcd’ 
‘bcd’ 
 ‘abc’ 
‘pass’  
‘key’ 
‘mass’ 
 ‘key’ 
Mean 126.87 126.49 
  
126.99 
 
127.36 127.65 127.87 
 
Standard 
deviation 
73.670 73.867 73.376 73.792 73.769 73.458 
Variance 5427.3 
 
5456.4 5384.1 5445.3 5441.9 5396.1 
Correlation -0.0044578 -0.013859 -0.0090254 
​Table.1 Statistical analysis (mean, standard deviation, variance) of generated vectors of 10000 pseudo-random              
bytes using PMSE with different password sets. The correlation between pairs of vectors is calculated below                
corresponding columns.  
These previous tests are completed with an image encryption and analysis using PMSE and compared               
with software-based random One-Time-Pad (OTP) encryption [11 -Horstmeyer et al.]. A microscopy            
image which includes a large parts of monochromatic dark is used (Figure 5-a). The RGB visualisation                
of the pseudo-random numbers generated with the same two small passwords (‘aa’ and ‘bb’) has been                
obtained (Figure 5-b). The image corresponds to a noisy image without any geometrical or repetition               
pattern that could be identified visually. The deconstructed image (Figure 5-c) is obtained with a four                
cases bits swapping and partial complementations (e.g. detailed in the Arduino code provided into the               
Supplementary data section). Some aspect of the initial image could be guessed, especially the shape               
of few crystals, but it is difficult to know what this image represented initially. Thanks to the partial                  
complementations implemented, the dark part of the initial image is also affected by the “image               
deconstruction” process. Important parameters that could be identified into a template attack like the              
main color or the shape of elements are not anymore consistent using only this simple four states                 
permutation of bits and partial complementation. The encrypted image (Figure 5-d) corresponds to the              
bitwise xor operation between pseudo-random matrix and deconstructed image. The identification of            
patterns into this image, if successful, would correspond to inconsistent informations due to the image               
deconstruction.  
As comparison, One-Time-Pad (OTP) encryption has been also implemented for RGB images on             
GNU Octave (cf. code provided into supplementary data). The pseudo-random matrix (OTP) for             
encryption is generated using the ​randi() function of GNU Octave for each RGB pixel. Results of OTP                 
and encrypted image obtained are shown in the Supplementary data section. The OTP generated with               
GNU Octave looks visually like truly random image without any repetition pattern (even if pure               
random number is ideal for fully computed numbers). The visualization of PMSE and OTP              
randomness calculated can be appreciated into the Supplementary data section on several encrypted             
images. 
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a)
 
b)
 
c)
 
d)
 
Fig.5 a) Initial/decrypted image (microscopic view of crystals) with size of 74x98 RGB pixels, b) Image                
“deconstructed” with bit swapping, c) Generated pseudo-random image (matrix of 245x326x3 8 bits numbers)              
using PMSE, d) encrypted image using PMSE with polynomial of order 1. Images obtained with PMSE and the                  
passwords respectively equals to ‘aa’ and ‘bb’. 
Visualisation of the pseudo-random numbers produced is a good fast way to examine randomness in a                
first approach: human brain is really good at identifying redundant or ordonated patterns into an               
image. But statistical approach can also estimate randomness. Statistical correlation and Shannon            
entropy have been computed using GNU Octave on pseudo-random or encrypted images obtained with              
PMSE or OTP encryption. The table 2 present the correlation respectively calculated between initial              
image, and “deconstructed image”, or pseudo-random image, or encrypted image using PMSE or OTP              
algorithm. We can notice that the correlation decreases if a second order polynom instead of first order                 
is used for image deconstruction. But the decrease is not valid on final encrypted image. More                
generally correlation values between initial image and encrypted are below 0.002 which is already a               
low correlation value obtained with OPT encryption. Notice that the randomness of the OPT              
implemented depends on the librairie for the ​randi() function of GNU Octave. Calculated values              
indicate that PMSE algorithm and OTP encryptions produced the same order of correlation and              
entropy (more comparizon on entropy score with different images have been computed into the              
Supplementary data section). Therefore statistically the randomness of PMSE algorithm can be            
considered as strong for  these image encryption examples. 
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 Statistical 
Correlation 
Initial 
image 
“Deconstructed 
image” 
Initial 
image 
Pseudo-rando
m image 
Initial 
image 
Encrypted 
image 
PMSE with polynomial of order 1 (Eq.1.1) 
{​‘aa’, ‘bb’​} 0.12394 0.0020117 -0.0000049691 
{‘bonjour’ , 
‘hello’} 
0.12747 0.0014874 0.00086004 
{‘mC5JLVGy6’
, ‘tpV2gyYcK’} 
0.12433 -0.0013692 -0.0041893 
PMSE with polynomial of order 2 (Eq.1.2) 
{‘mC5JLVGy6’
, ‘tpV2gyYcK’} 
0.10951 0.0022844 0.0014763 
OTP 
OTP 
random matrix 
NA -0.0011707 0.0021476 
​Table.2 Statistical correlation calculated between the initial image and respectively the deconstructed image,              
the generated pseudo-random image and the encrypted image using several sets of passwords pairs of vectors is                 
calculated below corresponding columns.  
 
Fig.6 Shannon entropy computed respectively on Initial image, “deconstructed” image, PMSE with 1st and 2nd               
order polynomial pseudo random matrix and encrypted image, and OTP random matrix obtained with randint()               
function (into GNU Octave) and the OPT encrypted image. 
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II.b Some comparative speed tests using Arduino 
The PMSE algorithm has been implemented in C and compiled for 8-bit microcontroller: the              
Arduino Uno (A​Tmega328​). The source code is provided into the Supplementary data section. Two              
versions have been tested, respectively with 1 or 2 password(s). The version using only one password,                
update the current variable ​x​2 with previous ​x​1​. The version which use two passwords is the one                 
already presented in this work and into sources codes provided. For comparison we build a program                
for encryption and decryption using AES. We used the open-source AES library developed by              
G.​​​​​ Gainaru for Arduino and Raspberry Pi [12]. This version implement AES in Cipher Block Chaining               
(CBC) mode with key of 128 or 256 bits. The comparison of processing time between AES and PMSE                  
both running on Arduino Uno is presented in Figure 7. The test implemented encrypt and decrypt a                 
same static text (string of 100 characters) with both algorithms. The AES and PMSE program use                
respectively 40% and 19% of the 2 kBytes SRAM of ATmega328 chip, so PMSE use approximately                
the half of dynamic memory to encrypt the same static content. 
 
Fig.7 Comparison of processing time on Arduino Uno between AES implementation for Arduino and PMSE               
using one or two passwords for encryption and decryption of 100 bytes (Clock speed: 16MHz, Architecture:                
Reduced Instruction Set Computer (RISC); ATmega328 processor complete one simple instruction in 63 ns). 
PMSE could have some advantage over the well established AES standard. Encryption            
process is done using blocks of 8-bits which is the common denominator of all processors from 8-bits                 
microcontrollers up to 64-bits multi-cores processors. The processing time is equivalent to AES but              
the algorithm is compact (few lines of codes) and uses less memory (RAM and ROM). Decryption                
time is almost equals to encryption time. Therefore, thanks to its modularity and compactness PMSE               
could find application into autonomous (or specific) embedded cryptographic systems or objects. In             
such systems, data is stored and manipulated as encrypted by default [13] and the object contains the                 
decryption and/or encryption mechanism. Clear data only appears in dynamic memories when            
decrypted and never into storage memory. Thus encryption doesn’t take place only on the transmission               
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protocol but also on stored and manipulated data. In the next section, we extend this concept to web                  
objects and we demonstrate a self-decryptionable web encrypted object embedded into HTML page. 
III. Application : blocksnet, self-decryptionable web encrypted object 
Self-decryptionable web encrypted object (WEO) is called “block” in this part. The concept of a block                
is described in Figure 8. Each block is web page that contains its own function to encrypt or decrypt (a                    
part of) its content. The encryption used is the PMSE algorithm developed here for compactness and                
robustness. The encrypted block (or content) can be decoded using the right set of passwords. Notice                
that a block having an encrypted content can be encrypted again (recursively) with an additional               
content. Thus it is possible to build kind of “Russian doll” structure of encrypted blocks. Other                
structures like chain or tree of web blocks are also possible. In this case, each block contains privately                  
one or more url which refers to other(s) block(s). Additionally checksum and timestamp are calculated               
for each encrypted block, so an encrypted blockchain structure can be build. 
An example of blocks structure illustrating the blocksnet concept (Figure 8) has been developed and is                
available online. In this example, the sequence of passwords must be guessed by human brains (solve                
it with computers would be a challenge). The short structure of blocks takes the scenario of a small                  
quizz game (Cf. [14]). The javascript source code or PMSE is available directly on those html blocks,                 
illustrating the blocksnet concept. Without the right answer (or keys) to the question, the block cannot                
be decrypted properly and absurd ASCII characters will appear due to the improper passwords              
provided for decryption.  
Usually standard scenario of cryptographic communication use Alice and Bob as interlocutors. In this              
case, block sharing between Alice and Bob could be simply done always integrating the key(s) or                
password(s) for the next bloc exchange into the current encrypted bloc. Only the first bloc exchange                
(initialization) must be done using public key cryptography or using any secured channel. This kind of                
exchange could be also done in broadcast mode (or master slave architecture) on a limited group of                 
people that receive/download information. Secured and costless data sharing could be done like this:              
clients/users receive an encrypted email (e.g. using PGP) with initial key from server (master). Then               
sequence or structure of blocks can be downloaded by users and it can be sequentially decrypted on                 
the clients/users side.  
In the context of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR, regulation (EU) 2016/679), in              
Europe, such self-decryptionable web encrypted objects could be useful to encrypt some personal data              
(e.g. biometric or financial ones) with a modular (or personalized) encryption algorithm. Thus this              
kind of private cryptography based on simple web technology could be consistent at user level in order                 
to guarantee self-privacy. With ​blocksnet​, data encryption and decryption could be done on user side               
only, so serverless architectures are possible. Thus by using this method, no sensitive clear data are                
stored on servers. But data could be also easily encrypted and stored by server in order to prevent                  
inappropriate or unconsented automatic data analysis. Blocksnet brings a dedicated response to single             
user data protection by implementing PMSE which is a non-standard tunable encryption algorithm. So              
versionnable implementations permit to encapsulate encrypted data and methods into common web            
pages for personalized user side decryption.  
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Fig.8 Illustration of self-decryptionable web encrypted object concept. Example of potential use. 
IV. Conclusion 
The implementation of the PMSE algorithm have been detailed. The pseudo-random byte generator             
has been implemented and tested statistically with some parameters. Then the data deconstruction             
process has been presented and illustrated using image deconstruction. Finally entropy and correlation             
calculated on encrypted image comparing OTP and PMSE encryption gave similar results, indicating             
that PMSE is robust enough to be comparable to a statistically random OTP encryption.  
Dedicated implementation of PMSE have been done in C and javascript. The processing performances              
have been compared with AES on Arduino Uno. PMSE use half less dynamic memory and about the                 
same encryption time on this 8-bit microcontroller (ATmega328). Self-decryptionable web encrypted           
object implemented in javascript are also presented and illustrated. This concept will have future              
applications such as personalized and secured encapsulation of personal data, application, software,            
documents or licences.  
In the future PMSE could be improved in term of compactness (less lines of code). The integration of                  
salt into encrypted flux would also improved the security of encrypted data. All polynomials,              
parameters and versions of this modular algorithm have not been tested yet. But the modularity of the                 
algorithm itself allows to change the cryptographic core at each use. Therefore, the difficulty to               
identify version and polynomial used for each encryption is improving the effective security of the               
algorithm. 
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Supplementary data  
 
Illustration of PMSE entropy with images encryption :  
The following images (cf. Table 1) are produced for several PMSE encryptions tests with the two                
same passwords (pass1='PMSE_encryption' and pass2 = 'blocksnet'). The comparison is done with            
One-Time-Pad (OTP) encryption (cf. GNU Octave code : One Time Pad (OTP) image encryption).              
Random pads (OPT) are computed with the function ​randi() of Octave. The Shannon entropy has been                
calculated with Octave for each image. It appears that for every encryption performed, the PMSE               
encryption give better or equal entropy score than the OTP encryption performed. Therefore the PMSE               
algorithm seems to be as good as an OTP encryptions using computed “random” masks.  
 
 
 
Table 1 - Comparison on image encryptions using PMSE and OTP 
Initial image PMSE encryption OTP encryption 
Image entropy = 
4.1333  
 
Deconstructed Image 
entropy =5.0029 
 
Encrypted Image 
entropy = ​7.9989
 
Encrypted Image 
entropy = ​7.9985 
 
Image entropy = 
7.5434
 
Deconstructed Image 
entropy = 7.8807
 
Encrypted Image 
entropy = ​7.9994
 
Encrypted Image 
entropy =  ​7.9993 
 
Image entropy = 
7.3110 
 
Deconstructed Image 
entropy = 7.7297
 
Encrypted Image 
entropy = ​7.9994
 
Encrypted Image 
entropy = ​7.9994 
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Image entropy = 
5.6249
 
 
Deconstructed Image 
entropy = 6.2439
 
Encrypted Image 
entropy = ​7.9991
 
Encrypted Image 
entropy = ​7.9988
 
GNU Octave code : PMSE image encryption and decryption 
 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
 %% PMSE image encryption and decryption - 10/2018   %% 
 %% This code has been developed by Etienne LEMAIRE  %% 
 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
 
clear all 
close all 
pkg load image 
 
pass1='PMSE_encryption' 
pass2 = 'blocksnet'; 
 
 
lp1  = sizeof(pass1); 
lp2  = sizeof(pass2); 
 
 
%iMG = imread('TUX_TEST.bmp'); 
iMG = imread('GRASS_TEST.bmp'); 
%iMG = imread('LAC_TEST.bmp'); 
%iMG = imread('PORTRAIT_TEST.bmp'); 
gen_key = iMG; 
gen_key = gen_key - iMG; 
 
[xl yl zl] = size(iMG); 
 
figure() 
imagesc(iMG); 
title('Initial/Decrypted image');  
 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%% Image encryption using PMSE 
a1 = 77; 
b1 = 51; 
c1 = 13; 
xc = 67; 
x3 = 11; 
xt = 234; 
x0 = 88; 
x1 = 97; 
x2 = 132; 
%dt_= 11; 
tmp1 = 1; 
tmp2 = 1; 
x_cs = 10; 
Yn = 9; 
 
for i=1:xl 
  for j=1:yl 
for k=1:zl  
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 I = i+j+k; 
   
 %% Polynomial 
 Yn = x2*(I*I) + x1*I + Yn/4; 
   
 xa = bitand(Yn,4278190080)/(2^24) ; % (Yn & 0xFF000000)>>24 ; 
 xb = bitand(Yn,16711680)/(2^16); % (Yn & 0xFF0000)>>16 ; 
 xc = bitand(Yn,65280)/(2^8); % (Yn & 0xFF00)>>8 ; 
 xd = bitand(Yn, 255); % Yn & 0xFF; 
 x0 = bitxor(xd, xc) + bitxor(xa,xb); % x0 = xd^xc + xa^xb ; 
  
 x1 = double(pass1(1+ mod(I,lp1-1))); 
 x2 = double(pass2(1+ mod(1 + x1 +I,lp2-1)));  
 x3 = mod(( I*x1 - x3*x2),255); 
 
 x1 =  bitxor(x0,x1); 
 tmp1 = bitxor(x1,x2); 
 tmp2 = bitxor(x3,xt); 
 xt =  bitand(bitxor(tmp1,tmp2),255); % xt = xt ^ x0 ^ (x1 ^ x2) ^ x3 ; 
 
   
 if (xt == 0) 
 a1 = mod(I,31); 
 b1 = mod(I,23); 
 c1 = mod(I,57); 
 x3 = mod(I,233); 
 xt = mod(I,157); 
 x0 = mod(I,103); 
 x1 = mod(I,97); 
 x2 = mod(I,131); 
 end; 
   
 % gen key storage 
 gen_key(i,j,k) = xt; 
 
   
 % DATA encoding : bits switching 
 dat_ = iMG(i,j,k); 
 dat_0xC0 = bitand(dat_,192); 
 dat_0x30 = bitand(dat_,48); 
 dat_0x0C = bitand(dat_,12); 
 dat_0x03 = bitand(dat_,3); 
 dat_0x0F = bitand(dat_,15); 
 dat_0xF0 = bitand(dat_,240); 
   
   
 %xn = x1+x2; 
 xn = x0; 
   
 if ( mod(xn,4)==0)  
 dat_r = (dat_0x0F*(2^4)) + (dat_0xF0/(2^4));  
 dat_r = bitxor(dat_r, 192); % dat_r^0xC0 
 end; 
   
 if ( mod(xn,4)==1)  
 dat_r = (dat_0x0F*(2^4)) + (dat_0xF0/(2^4)); 
 dat_r = bitxor(dat_r, 12); end; 
 if ( mod(xn,4)==2)  
 dat_r = dat_0x0C*(2^2) + dat_0x03*(2^2) + dat_0xC0/(2^6) + dat_0x30*(2^2); 
 dat_r = bitxor(dat_r, 192); end; 
   
 if ( mod(xn,4)==3)  
 dat_r = dat_0x0C*(2^2) + dat_0x03*(2^6) + dat_0xC0/(2^6) + dat_0x30/(2^2); 
 dat_r = bitxor(dat_r, 12); end;  
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 % "randomized" data storage 
 rand_data(i,j,k) = dat_r; 
   
 % symmetric XOR (en)coding 
 %iMG_crypt(i,j,k) = bitxor(iMG(i,j,k),xt); 
 iMG_crypt(i,j,k) = bitxor(dat_r,xt); 
   
 % checksum 
 x_cs = bitxor(iMG_crypt(i,j,k), x_cs) + x_cs ; 
  
end; 
   end; 
  end; 
 
E_key = entropy(gen_key) 
E_img_enc = entropy(iMG_crypt) 
E_dimg = entropy(rand_data) 
E_img_ = entropy(iMG) 
 
 
  %moy_ = mean(res) 
  ecart_type_img = std(iMG(:)) 
  ecart_type_key = std(gen_key(:)) 
  ecart_type_dec_img = std(rand_data(:)) 
  ecart_type_enc_img = std(iMG_crypt(:)) 
  %variance_ = var(res)  
  autocorrelation = cov(iMG(:),iMG(:))./(ecart_type_img.*ecart_type_img) 
  correlation_ik = cov(iMG(:),gen_key(:))./(ecart_type_img.*ecart_type_key) 
  correlation_id = cov(iMG(:),rand_data(:))./(ecart_type_img.*ecart_type_dec_img) 
  correlation_ie = cov(iMG(:),iMG_crypt(:))./(ecart_type_img.*ecart_type_dec_img) 
 
figure 
imagesc(gen_key); 
title('Generated pseudo-random flux')  
  
figure 
imagesc(iMG_crypt); 
title('Encoded image')  
 
figure 
imagesc(rand_data); 
title('Deconstructed image') 
 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%% Image decoding using PMSE 
 
a1 = 77; 
b1 = 51; 
c1 = 13; 
xc = 67; 
x3 = 11; 
xt = 234; 
x0 = 88; 
x1 = 97; 
x2 = 132; 
%dt_= 11; 
tmp1 = 1; 
tmp2 = 1; 
x_cs = 10; 
Yn = 9; 
 
for i=1:xl 
  for j=1:yl 
for k=1:zl  
  
 I = i+j+k; 
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 %% Polynomial 
 Yn = x2*(I*I) + x1*I + Yn/4; 
   
 xa = bitand(Yn,4278190080)/(2^24) ; % (Yn & 0xFF000000)>>24 ; 
 xb = bitand(Yn,16711680)/(2^16); % (Yn & 0xFF0000)>>16 ; 
 xc = bitand(Yn,65280)/(2^8); % (Yn & 0xFF00)>>8 ; 
 xd = bitand(Yn, 255); % Yn & 0xFF; 
 x0 = bitxor(xd, xc) + bitxor(xa,xb); % x0 = xd^xc + xa^xb ; 
  
 x1 = double(pass1(1+ mod(I,lp1-1))); 
 x2 = double(pass2(1+ mod(1 + x1 +I,lp2-1))); % char selection for pseudo 
rand xd 
 x3 = mod(( I*x1 - x3*x2),255); 
 
 x1 =  bitxor(x0,x1); 
 tmp1 = bitxor(x1,x2); 
 tmp2 = bitxor(x3,xt); 
 xt =  bitand(bitxor(tmp1,tmp2),255); % xt = xt ^ x0 ^ (x1 ^ x2) ^ x3 ; 
 
   
 if (xt == 0) 
 a1 = mod(I,31); 
 b1 = mod(I,23); 
 c1 = mod(I,57); 
 x3 = mod(I,233); 
 xt = mod(I,157); 
 x0 = mod(I,103); 
 x1 = mod(I,97); 
 x2 = mod(I,131); 
 end; 
   
 % gen key storage 
 gen_key(i,j,k) = xt; 
 
 % symmetric XOR (de)coding 
 iMG_dec(i,j,k) = bitxor(iMG_crypt(i,j,k),xt);  
   
 %xn = x1+x2; 
 xn = x0; 
   
 dat_r = iMG_dec(i,j,k); 
   
 if ( mod(xn,4)==0)  
 dat_r = bitxor(dat_r, 192); % dat_r^0xC0   
   
 end; 
   
 if ( mod(xn,4)==1)  
 dat_r = bitxor(dat_r, 12); % dat_r^0x0C 
   
 end; 
 if ( mod(xn,4)==2)  
 dat_r = bitxor(dat_r, 192); % dat_r^0xC0 
   
 end; 
   
 if ( mod(xn,4)==3)  
 dat_r = bitxor(dat_r, 12); % dat_r^0x0C 
   
 end;  
   
   
   
 % DATA decoding : bits switching 
 dat_0xC0 = bitand(dat_r,192); 
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 dat_0x30 = bitand(dat_r,48); 
 dat_0x0C = bitand(dat_r,12); 
 dat_0x03 = bitand(dat_r,3); 
 dat_0x0F = bitand(dat_r,15); 
 dat_0xF0 = bitand(dat_r,240); 
   
   
   
 if ( mod(xn,4)==0)   
 dat_r = (dat_0x0F*(2^4)) + (dat_0xF0/(2^4)); 
   
 end; 
   
 if ( mod(xn,4)==1)   
 dat_r = (dat_0x0F*(2^4)) + (dat_0xF0/(2^4)); 
 end; 
 if ( mod(xn,4)==2)   
 dat_r = dat_0x0C/(2^2) + dat_0x03*(2^6) + dat_0xC0/(2^2) + dat_0x30/(2^2); 
 end; 
   
 if ( mod(xn,4)==3)   
 dat_r = dat_0x0C*(2^2) + dat_0x03*(2^6) + dat_0xC0/(2^6) + dat_0x30/(2^2); 
 end;  
   
 % recontructed data 
 iMG_dec2(i,j,k) = dat_r; 
   
 
 % checksum 
 x_cs = bitxor(iMG_crypt(i,j,k), x_cs) + x_cs ; 
  
end; 
   end; 
  end; 
 
figure 
imagesc(iMG_dec); 
title('Partially decoded image')  
  
figure 
imagesc(iMG_dec2); 
title('Reconstructed image') 
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Illustration of PMSE pseudo-random generated images with several sets of 
passwords :  
Images of the pseudo-random numbers produced with PMSE and several set of passwords, the              
corresponding Shannon entropy for each image is calculated.  
 
Initial image 
Image entropy = 6.6006 
 
“Deconstructed” image 
Image entropy = 6.9949 
 
1st order non-recursive polynomial : Y​n​ = x​2​*i + x​1 
Passwords: {‘aa’, ‘bb’} 
Pseudo-random image entropy = 7.9933 
 
 
Passwords: {‘bonjour’, ‘hello’} 
Pseudo-random image entropy = 7.9929 
 
Passwords: {‘dA4wJ6’, ‘lUVmX2’} 
Pseudo-random image entropy = 7.9927
Passwords: {‘mC5JLVGy6’, ‘tpV2gyYcK’} 
Pseudo-random image entropy = 7.9929 
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2nd order recursive polynomial: Y​n​ = x​2​*i​
2​ + x​1​*i + Y​n-1​/4 
Passwords: {‘aa’, ‘bb’} 
Pseudo-random image entropy = 7.9938 
 
 
Passwords: {‘bonjour’, ‘hello’} 
Pseudo-random image entropy = 7.9939 
 
Passwords: {‘dA4wJ6’, ‘lUVmX2’} 
Pseudo-random image entropy = 7.9936 
 
Passwords: {‘mC5JLVGy6’, ‘tpV2gyYcK’} 
Pseudo-random image entropy = 7.9939 
 
NB: ​the entropy of images with differents set of passwords has been computed using GNU Octave :                 
https://octave.sourceforge.io/image/function/entropy.html 
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GNU Octave code : pseudo-random flux generator from two passwords 
 ​%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
 %% Pseudo-random byte generator of PMSE - 10/2018    %% 
 %% This code has been developed by Etienne LEMAIRE  %% 
 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
  
clear all 
close all 
 
pass1 = 'aa'; 
pass2 = 'bb'; 
 
lp1  = sizeof(pass1); 
lp2  = sizeof(pass2); 
Long_msg = 10000; 
x3 = 11; 
xt = 234; 
x0 = 88; 
x1 = 77; 
x2 = 132; 
res_srt = ''; 
 
 
for i=1:Long_msg 
  
 Yn = x2*(i) + x1; 
 xa = bitand(Yn/(2^24), 255); 
 xb = bitand(Yn/(2^16), 255); % (xa & 0xFF0000)>>16 ; 
 xc = bitand(Yn/(2^8),255); % (xa & 0xFF00)>>8 ; 
 xd = bitand(Yn, 255); % xa & 0xFF; 
 x0 = bitxor(xd, xc) + bitxor(xa, xb); % x0 = xd ^ xc + xb ; 
  
  x1 = double(pass1(1+ mod(i,lp1-1))); 
  x2 = double(pass2(1+ mod(i+ x1,lp2-1))); % char selection for pseudo rand x0 
  x3 = mod((i + x3 + x2 - x1),255); 
  
  x1 =  bitxor(x0,x1); 
  tmp1 = bitxor(x1,x2); 
  tmp2 = bitxor(x3,xt); 
  %xt = bitxor(tmp1,tmp2); 
  xt =  bitand(bitxor(tmp1,tmp2),255); 
  if (xt == 0) 
 x3 = mod(i,233); 
 xt = mod(i,157); 
 x0 = mod(i,103); 
 x1 = mod(i,97); 
 x2 = mod(i,131); 
 end; 
  res(i) = xt; 
  res_srt = strcat(res_srt,char(xt)); 
  end; 
 
  % Stats 
  moy_ = mean(res) 
  ecart_type = std(res) 
  variance_ = var(res)  
  correlation = cov(res,res_)./(ecart_type.*ecart_type_) 
  
  
  % FFT de res(i) 
  Y = fft(res); 
  [u L]=size(res); 
  P2 = abs(Y/L); 
  P1 = P2(1:L/2+1); 
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  P1(2:end-1) = 2*P1(2:end-1); 
  figure() 
  hold on 
  Fs =1; 
  f = Fs*(0:(L/2))/L; 
  semilogy(f,P1) %(1:5001) 
  %title('Single-Sided Amplitude Spectrum of X(t)') 
  xlabel('f') 
  ylabel('|H(f)|') 
  
  
  %disp(res_srt); 
  %figure 
  %plot(res, '.b') 
  %xlabel('Iterations (length)') 
  %ylabel('Ascii code [0-255]') 
  figure 
  plot(res(1:512), '.-') 
  xlabel('Iterations (length)') 
  ylabel('Ascii code [0-255]') 
  figure 
  plot(res(4096:(4096+512)), '.-') 
  xlabel('Iterations (length)') 
  ylabel('Ascii code [0-255]') 
  figure 
  hist(res, 255) 
  xlabel('Ascii code [0-255]') 
  ylabel('Number of occurrences') 
  %histfit(res) 
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One Time Pad (OTP) encryption figures: 
Images produced with the OTP encryption (cf. Octave code provided below), the corresponding             
Shannon entropy for each image is calculated.  
Entropy of initial  image: 6.6006 
 
Entropy of random OTP key (image): 7.9936 
 
Entropy of OTP encrypted image: 7.9990 
 
Entropy of decrypted image: 6.6006 
 
 
 
GNU Octave code : One Time Pad (OTP) image encryption 
 
 ​%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
 %% One Time Pad image encryption test - 10/2018 %% 
 %% This code has been developed by Etienne LEMAIRE  %% 
 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
 
clear all 
close all 
%pkg load statistics 
pkg load image 
pkg load communications 
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% load image 
iMG = imread('IMG_TEST.bmp'); 
gen_key = iMG; 
gen_key = gen_key - iMG; 
 
figure() 
imagesc(iMG); 
title('Initial image'); 
 
% compute image entropy 
E_img_ = entropy(iMG) 
 
[x y z]= size(iMG); 
 
% One Time Pad (OTP) generation using randint 
% https://octave.sourceforge.io/communications/function/randint.html 
R_otp = randint (x, y, 255); 
G_otp = randint (x, y, 255); 
B_otp = randint (x, y, 255); 
 
key_otp = iMG - iMG; 
key_otp(:,:,1) = R_otp; 
key_otp(:,:,2) = G_otp; 
key_otp(:,:,3) = B_otp; 
 
% display OTP random matrix 
figure() 
imagesc(key_otp); 
title('OTP key'); 
 
% compute OTP random key entropy 
E_key_ = entropy(key_otp) 
% correlation between random key and encrypted image 
correlation_key_img = 
cov(iMG(:),key_otp(:))./(std(iMG(:)).*std(key_otp(:))) 
 
% One Time Pad (OTP) encryption 
iMG_otp = bitxor(iMG, key_otp); 
 
figure() 
imagesc(iMG_otp); 
title('OTP encrypted image'); 
 
% compute encrypted image entropy 
E_enc_ = entropy(iMG_otp) 
% correlation between initial image and encrypted image 
correlation_enc_img = 
cov(iMG(:),iMG_otp(:))./(std(iMG(:)).*std(iMG_otp(:))) 
 
 
% One Time Pad (OTP) decryption 
iMG_dec = bitxor(iMG_otp, key_otp); 
 
figure() 
imagesc(iMG_dec); 
title('OTP decrypted image'); 
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Arduino code : PMSE on Arduino 
 
 ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
 // PMSE de/encryption implemented on Arduino Uno - 10/2018 // 
 // This code has been developed by Etienne LEMAIRE // 
 ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
 
 
char texte[100] = "Bonjour, je teste PMSE, pretty modular symetric 
encryption, ceci est simplement un test! Encore un!"; 
char pass_1[14] = "zc2dhvnepc#b91"; 
char pass_2[8] = "coucou21"; 
char iv_[24] = "1q23df5r8tyb6d9r5t7k6s4e"; 
 
void setup() { 
  // Serial setup 
  Serial.begin(9600); 
  
} 
 
void loop() { 
  //Encryption time 
  Serial.print("- encryption time [us]: "); 
  unsigned long ms = micros (); 
  pmse_encrypt(texte, 100, pass_1, 14, pass_2, 8, iv_); 
  Serial.println(micros() - ms); 
  Serial.println(texte); 
  //Decryption time 
  Serial.print("- decryption time [us]: "); 
  ms = micros (); 
  pmse_decrypt(texte, 100, pass_1, 14, pass_2, 8, iv_); 
  Serial.println(micros() - ms); 
  Serial.println(texte); 
} 
  
 
 
 
 
////////////////////////////////// 
// PMSE Library v0-beta 10/18   // 
// developed by Etienne LEMAIRE // 
///////////////////////////////// 
 
// encryption fonction 
void pmse_encrypt(char *msg, int l_msg, char *pass, int l_pass, char 
*pass2, int l_pass2, char iv[24]){ 
 
int x0 = (int)iv[0]; 
int x1 = (int)iv[1]; 
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int x2 = (int)iv[2]; 
int x3 = (int)iv[3]; 
 
int a1 = (int)iv[4]; 
int b1 = (int)iv[5]; 
int c1 = (int)iv[6]; 
 
char xt = iv[7], data =0, xa=0, xb=0, xc=0, xd=0; 
 
int tmp1 = (int)iv[8]; 
int tmp2 = (int)iv[9]; 
int Yn = (int)iv[10]; 
 
int i=0; 
 
for ( i=0; i<l_msg ; i++){ 
 
 // Pseudo random byte generation 
 Yn = x2*i + x1; 
 
 xa = (Yn & 0xFF000000)>>24 ; 
 xb = (Yn & 0xFF0000)>>16 ; 
 xc = (Yn & 0xFF00)>>8 ; 
 xd = Yn & 0xFF; 
 x0 = (xa^xb^xc^xd); 
 
 x1 = pass[i % l_pass]; 
 x2 = pass2[(i+x1)%(l_pass2)]; 
 x3 = (i*x1 - x3*x2)%255; 
 xt = (xt^x0^x1^x2^x3)&0xFF; 
 
 if (xt==0){ 
 a1 = i%iv[11]; 
 b1 = i%iv[12]; 
 c1 = i%iv[13]; 
 xt = i%iv[14]; 
 x0 = i%iv[15]; 
 x1 = i%iv[16]; 
 x2 = i%iv[17]; 
 x3 = i%iv[18]; 
 
 } 
 
 // data "desconstruction" 
 data = msg[i]; 
 if ((xd & 0x03)==0){ 
 data = ((data&0x0F)<<4) + ((data&0xF0)>>4); 
 // data = data^0xC0; 
 } 
 if ((xd & 0x03)==1){ 
 data = ((data&0x3F)<<2) + ((data&0xC0)>>6); 
 // data = data^0x0A; 
 } 
 if ((xd & 0x03)==2){ 
 data = ((data&0x33)<<2) + ((data&0xCC)>>2); 
 // data = data^0xA0; 
 } 
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 if ((xd & 0x03)==3){ 
 data = ((data&0x1F)<<3) + ((data&0xE0)>>5); 
 // data = data^0x0C; 
 } 
 
 // data encryption 
 msg[i] = data^xt; 
 
} 
 
} 
 
 
// decoding fonction 
void pmse_decrypt(char *msg, int l_msg, char *pass, int l_pass, char 
*pass2, int l_pass2, char iv[24]){ 
 
int x0 = (int)iv[0]; 
int x1 = (int)iv[1]; 
int x2 = (int)iv[2]; 
int x3 = (int)iv[3]; 
 
int a1 = (int)iv[4]; 
int b1 = (int)iv[5]; 
int c1 = (int)iv[6]; 
 
char xt = iv[7], data =0, xa=0, xb=0, xc=0, xd=0; 
 
int tmp1 = (int)iv[8]; 
int tmp2 = (int)iv[9]; 
int Yn = (int)iv[10]; 
 
int i=0; 
 
for ( i=0; i<l_msg ; i++){ 
 
 // Pseudo random byte generation 
 Yn = x2*i + x1; 
   
 xa = (Yn & 0xFF000000)>>24 ; 
 xb = (Yn & 0xFF0000)>>16 ; 
 xc = (Yn & 0xFF00)>>8 ; 
 xd = Yn & 0xFF; 
 x0 = (xa^xb^xc^xd); 
 
 x1 = pass[i % l_pass]; 
 x2 = pass2[(i+x1)%(l_pass2)]; 
 x3 = (i*x1 - x3*x2)%255; 
 xt = (xt^x0^x1^x2^x3)&0xFF; 
 
 if (xt==0){ 
 a1 = i%iv[11]; 
 b1 = i%iv[12]; 
 c1 = i%iv[13]; 
 xt = i%iv[14]; 
 x0 = i%iv[15]; 
 x1 = i%iv[16]; 
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 x2 = i%iv[17]; 
 x3 = i%iv[18]; 
 
 } 
 data = msg[i]; 
   
 // partial decoding 
 data = data^xt; 
 
 // data "reconstruction" 
 
 if ((xd & 0x03)==0){ 
 data = ((data&0x0F)<<4) + ((data&0xF0)>>4); 
 // data = data^0xC0; 
 } 
 if ((xd & 0x03)==1){ 
 data = ((data&0xFC)>>2) + ((data&0x03)<<6); 
 // data = data^0x0A; 
 } 
 if ((xd & 0x03)==2){ 
 data = ((data&0x33)<<2) + ((data&0xCC)>>2); 
 // data = data^0xA0; 
 } 
 if ((xd & 0x03)==3){ 
 data = ((data&0xF8)>>3) + ((data&0x07)<<5); 
 // data = data^0x0C; 
 } 
 
 msg[i]=data; 
} 
 
} 
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